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ABSTRACT 
In this paper, the Income-Population-Affluence-Technology, or I=PAT, model is reformulated in terms 
of households (i.e., I=HAT) as opposed to perxzs. E::? = zagagroach is prefczble in the case of 
environmental impacts, such as C02 emissions, ~vhich are caused by activities such as residential 
heating and automobile transport, for which there exist significant household-level economies of scale. 
Because of historical changes in average household size, the IHAT identity gives rise to a very 
different decomposition of the sources of growth in environmental impacts than does the IPAT identity. 
Taking growth in commercial energy consumption as an example, we find that the IPAT identity 
attributes 18.2% of the annual increase (in absolute terms) over the period 1970-90 to industrialized- 
country demographic increase, whereas the IHAT model attributes 41.5% because of the significant 
decrease of mean household sizes. The difference between the two decompositions is simply that, in 
the first, it is the individual who is the demographic unit of account, whereas in the latter, it is the 
household. 
Based on the IIASA world population projections and derived projections of households, the IPAT and 
IHAT identities are employed to project the level of C02 emissions in the year 2100. In the case 
where the level of emissions per demographic unit is assumed to remain constant at 1990 levels, the 
IHAT projection for 2100 is over 40% higher than the IPAT projection; in the case where emissions 
per demographic unit are projected to increase over rime, tine MAT projection is over 80% higher. 
We conclude that decomposition and projection extrcisss are verq sensitive to the unit of account 
chosen. Should the unit of analysis be the individual, the household, the community, or what? Until 
more is known about the nature of the many activities which give rise to environmental impacts -- 
specifically, the role of economies of scale -- it is unwise to draw far-reaching conclusions from one 
specific choice of model without a substantive justification of that choice. 
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POPULATION, HOUSEHOLDS AND CO, EMISSIONS 
F. Landis MacKellar 
Wolfgang Lutz 
Christopher Prinz 
Anne Goujon 
INTRODUCTION 
The controversy over whether rapid population growth in the South or high consumption in the North 
is to blame for anticipated future changes in world climate is almost invariably framed in terms of the 
simple identity I=PAT. Environmental impact (I) is seen as the product of the three factors population 
(P), affluence (A) which is measured by GNPJperson, and technological efficiency (T) which may be 
captured by impact per unit of GNP. This identity is useful and suggestive as a first approach to the 
issue, because it demonstrates that environmental impact is due, not to one factor alone, but to a 
combination of several factors. However, IPAT has serious limitations if taken as a basis for more 
rigorous scientific analysis. 
The problems with choosing IPAT as the basis for analysis can be grouped into two broad categories: 
(1) questions related to the choice of variables, and (2) the omission of interactions between the 
variables: 
(1) In some decomposition exercises, such as the decomposition of trends in the crude birth rate into 
age-structure and fertility-rate effects, the choice of variables is a straightforward matter of 
accounting. In the case of IPAT the choice is much less self-evident. If the impact to be studied 
is, say, C 0 2  emissions, why should the emitting unit be the individual rather than the engine or 
fireplace that is ultimately responsible, or, as we will develop in the following paper, the 
household that operates the emitting units? The choice of factors requires substantive 
justification and may not be taken for granted. 
(2) IPAT cannot really contribute much to the resolution of the population versus consumption 
debate because the differences of opinion mostly concern the interactions between the P, A and 
T factors. The Malthusian view argues that population growth diminishes affluence and thereby 
impedes technical progress, while the Boserupian view argues that population growth enhances 
technology and thereby increases affluence, while the modernization argument stresses that 
increasing affluence and technical progress combine to reduce the rate of population growth. 
Analysis along the simple IPAT approach can do nothing to resolve these controversies 
empirically, because the controversial relationships are not explicit in the equation. 
The following paper concerns itself with the first problem, specifically, with the accounting 
implications of the fact that IPAT selects the individual as the demographic unit. We illustrate the 
consequences of considering households (H) instead of individuals as the consuming unit (i.e., IHAT 
instead of PAT).  The substantive justification for this lies in the fact that for many goods, such as 
automobile transport and residential energy consumption, there are significant economies of scale -- 
for example, a household of four persons will consume far less than twice as much as a household 
consisting of two persons. For goods whose consumption is tied more closely to the household than 
the individual, the size and rate of growth of population is of less concern than the number and rate 
of growth of households. 
The organization of the paper is as follows. In the next section, trends in the rate of growth of 
households are compared to trends in the rate of growth of population and the roles of changing age- 
specific household headship rates and changing population age structures are discussed. In the third 
section, an illustrative simulation is presented in which growth in world energy demand from 1970 to 
1990 is decomposed using the P A T  and IHAT identities. Because of the rapid growth over this period 
in the number of households in developed countries, the IPAT and IHAT identities result in very 
different allocations of responsibility between demographic and economic factors, on the one hand, and 
between the North and the South. The P A T  and IHAT models are then used to calculate substantially 
different projections of C 0 2  emissions from 1990-2100. The fundamental point of both simulation 
exercises is that the entire decomposition approach is rather arbitrary, depending as it does on the 
demographic unit of account. 
AVERAGE HOUSEHOLD SIZE: HISTORICAL TRENDS AND OUTLOOK 
Average household size is the inverse of the average headship rate, which is defined as the number of 
persons in the population who are heads of household divided by the population, expressed as a rate 
per 1000. Age-specific headship rates are defined by the number of heads of households in a certain 
age-group divided by the total number of persons in that age group. The average headship rate can 
therefore be expressed as a weighted average of age-specific headship rates, the weights being the 
proportion of the population in each age group. The observed patterns of average household size and 
average headship rates result from a combination of these two effects. 
Between 1950 and 1990, average household size in presently developed countries underwent a decline 
which, in proportional terms, can fairly be termed massive: from 3.6 to 2.7 (see Table 1 for regional 
trends and the Statistical Note for a description of estimation procedures followed). This decline was 
due more-or-less equally to changes in population age structure (mostly ageing) and to increases in age- 
specific headship rates; the former is an accounting effect while the latter reflects actual changes in 
behavior. Among these changes were young persons' moving away from home earlier, declining age- 
specific nuptiality rates (with consequent increase in mean age at marriage), and the growing tendency 
of the aged to live on their own rather than with their children. 
Table 1. Changes in household size from 1950 to 1990. 
North Africa 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
North America 
Central America 
South America 
West & Central Asia 
South Asia 
China & Hong Kong 
Southeast Asia 
Japan & Australia & New Zealand 
East Europe 
West Europe 
World 
More Developed Countries 
Less Developed Countries 
Average household size Changes due to: 
Age Age-specific 
distribution headship rates 
0.1 0.6 
0.3 0.2 
-0.3 -0.6 
-0.1 0.4 
-0.5 -0.1 
-0.1 0.2 
0.0 0.7 
-0.2 -0.7 
-0.3 -0.1 
-1.1 -0.6 
-0.6 -0.2 
-0.3 -0.6 
In presently developing countries, by contrast, average household size remained practically unchanged, 
declining only from 5.0 in 1950 to 4.8 in 1990. In fact, if China is excluded, average household size 
in developing regions increased significantly.' T!it kcicasc kvas most pronounced in South Asia, 
where reductions in age-specific headship rates caused average household size to rise from 5.0 to 5.7. 
Even in South America, where average household size declined from 5.0 to 4.4, the decline was 
accounted for almost entirely by age-structure effects; age-specific headship rates remained practically 
constant. 
Further information can be gained by dividing the post-war period in two and comparing changes in 
1950-70 with changes in 1970-90 (see Table 2). During the first twenty years, in industrialized 
countries, increases in age-specific headship rates were the most important source of change, with age- 
structure changes playing a secondary role. The situation was reversed during the last twenty years: 
population ageing was the driving force, and changes in age-specific headship rates were relatively 
unimportant. In developing countries, a similar reversal is observed. In 1950-70, age-specific headship 
rates actually increased significantly, but age-structure effects (i.e., the young population age structure 
associated with mortality decline and unchanged fertility levels) favored large households. In 1970-90, 
by contrast, fertility decline started to work its way through the age structure in most regions, leading 
to an increase in the share of young adults in the population and consequent decline in average 
household size. Age-specific headship rates declined marginally, except in North Africa and Central 
America. 
What does the future hold? Research on the decline ci the extended family in presently developed 
countries has identified three basic themes, one demographic, one sociological and one e c o n ~ m i c . ~  
The demographic view (Kuznets 1978) emphasizes that residence in an extended household unit must 
necessarily decline along with fertility for a simple demographic reason: there are fewer kin (including 
siblings) to live with. The sociological view argues that there has been an exogenous shift in tastes 
towards privacy (Beresford and Rivlin 1966). The economic view (Smith et al. 1984; Santi 1990; 
Skaburskis 1994) concentrates on factors such as income and the price of housing. Bumpass (1990) 
and many others have synthesized the three views to arb= convincingly that no end is in sight to the 
shift towards more atomized living arrangements in industrial countries. The data in Table 2 indicate 
that increases in age-specific headship rates contributed only -0.1 to the change in average household 
size in developed countries in 1970-90, as opposed to -0.3 in 1950-70. However, future declines in 
the proportion of the population aged under 15 and increases in the proportion aged 60 and over 
suggest that, even barring future individuation, average household size will continue to decline. 
Research on household structure in presently developing countries is somewhat limited by data 
availability. Foster (1993, pp. 104-105) finds that household structure in Bangladesh has been 
surprisingly resistant to change, and cites consistent research results from elsewhere in South Asia. 
It might be argued, first, that the period covered by Foster (eight years) is insufficient for much change 
to occur, and second, that Bangladesh is a stagnating economy. Over 12 years of extraordinarily 
dynamic economic growth in Taiwan (1973-85), Weinstein et al. (1990) found that the proportion of 
couples living in nuclear households increased from 43% to 56%, leading the authors to have it both 
' The figures given for China must be interpreted with caution. Data on average household size were 
available only for the years 1982 and 1984. While they imply a decline, mostly as a consequence of declining 
fertility, they give little indication of the long-term trend since 1950. 
* The literature on household and family demography is vast, and no attempt is made here to do it justice. 
Among the better compilations of international data on average household size from the 1950s to the 1970s is 
Kuznets (1982). 
ways: they note the "gradual erosion of norms" sanctioning co-residence, but at the same time 
emphasize that nearly half of Taiwanese couples in 1985 were still living in extended units. 
Table 2. Changes in household size from 1950 to 1970 and from 1970 to 1990. 
North Africa 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
North America 
Central America 
South America 
West & Central Asia 
South Asia 
China & Hong Kong 
Southeast Asia 
Japan & Australia & New Zealand 
East Europe 
West Europe 
World 
More Developed Countries 
Less Developed Countries 
North Africa 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
North America 
Central America 
South America 
West & Central Asia 
South Asia 
China & Hong Kong 
Southeast Asia 
Japan & Australia & New Zealand 
East Europe 
West Europe 
World 
More Developed Countries 
Less Developed Countries 
Average household size Changes due to: 
Age Age-specific 
distribution headship rates 
0.3 0.0 
0.2 0.1 
0.2 -0.6 
0.5 -0.2 
0.1 -0.1 
0.2 0.1 
0.2 0.4 
0.7 -1 .O 
0.3 -0.2 
-0.7 -0.4 
-0.3 -0.1 
-0.1 -0.3 
Average household size Changes due to: 
Age Age-specific 
distribution headship rates 
-0.2 G.6 
0.1 0.1 
-0.5 0.0 
-0.6 0.6 
-0.6 0.0 
-0.3 0.1 
-0.2 0.3 
-0.9 0.3 
-0.6 0.1 
-0.4 -0.2 
-0.4 0.0 
-0.2 -0.3 
Goode (1963) proposed that the decline of the traditional extended family was an inevitab!e 
accompaniment of industrialization and what is indelicately termed "modernization." This gives rise 
to a "stages of development" interpretation according to which age-specific headship rates in Third 
World countries will decline as countries attain a higher material standard of living. One explanation 
might be that complex, extended household units are inherently less capable of allocating substantial 
resources harmoniously than are simple, nuclear ones. It might also be argued that the extended 
households provide insurance against risk (on the downside) which is no longer necessary once income 
is tolerably above the subsistence level. On the other hand, "stages of development" models have been 
criticized by many for lacking rigorous micro-level foundations and for postulating a rigid relationship 
between per person income and various social indices. For example, Yi et al. (1994) found that the 
mean age of leaving the parental home was about 3 years higher for young adults in China, Japan and 
South Korea than in the U.S., France and Sweden. Japan is, of course, not a developing country, 
which gives rise to two possible interpretations: either cultural factors are as important as "stage of 
development" or rapid economic development in Japan has not yet manifested itself in changing 
household structure. Moreover, differences between the U.S. and the two European countries were 
fairly substantial. 
For purposes of forecasting the course of average household size in developing countries, an 
understanding of the causal mechanisms behind the long-term decline in age-specific headship rates 
is less important than might be thought. A comparison of estimated age-specific headship rates by 
region in about 1980 reveals a striking fact: differences between ages 40 and 65 are almost negligible 
(see Table 3). Under age 40 and over age 65, headship rates in developing countries are naturally 
lower because of the greater force of the extended family. However, if age-specific rates are applied 
to the 1990 population in developed countries to calculate an age-standardized headship rate, a striking 
fact emerges: the age-standardized rate in developed countries, 367 (average household size of 2.7) is 
only about 10% higher than the age-standardized headship rate in developing countries, 329 (average 
household size of 3.0). 
It would thus seem that future changes in population age structure in developing countries will have 
a greater impact on average household size than will changes in age-specific headship rates. In other 
words, compositional effects are likely to be more important than the less certain (and more 
controversial) behavioral changes in family formation and living arrangements which may arise in the 
context of "modernization." The age-structure changes which have been mentioned above in the case 
of presently developed regions -- decline in the proportion at young ages, increase in the proportion 
who are elderly -- will be more extreme for presently developing countries because of the speed of 
fertility decline. Thus, even with no changes in age-specific headship rates, it is likely that average 
household size in presently developing regions will decline substantially. 
Table 4 presents the results of four projections of average household size. "Central," "Low" and 
"High" Scenarios correspond to IIASA population scenarios3; age-specific headship rates are assumed 
to remain constant at 1990 levels (see Table 3), so differences in average household size between these 
variants are entirely due to differences in population age structure. The final variant, the Modified 
Central Scenario, was calculated by applying the average developed-region age-specific headship rates 
for 1990 to the Central Scenario population projection for developing regions; thus, differences in the 
outlook for developing regions in the Central and Modified Central Scenarios are due entirely to 
differences in age-specific headship rates.4 
3 In the Central Scenario, central mortality and fertility assumptions are used; the High Scenario, which might 
be termed "slow demographic transition," combines high fertility assumptions with high mortality assumptions; 
the Low Scenario, which might be termed "rapid demographic transition," assumes rapid fertility decline and 
rapid improvements in life expectancy. The assumptions and results are discussed in detail in Lutz (1994). 
Making an explicit assumption on how rapidly age-specific headship rates in developing regions converge 
on the developed-region average would be an obvious refinement, but makes little difference in results. 
Table 3. Headship rates by age and region. These headship rates have been estimated by aggregation, analysis and comparison of available country headship 
rates. Year of reference varies from country to country. Source: UN 1987. 
N. Africa 
S.S. Africa 
N. America 
C. America 
S. America 
WBC Asia 
S. Asia 
ChinaBHK 
S.E. Asia 
JapB AusBN 
E. Europe 
W. Europe 
World 
Less Dev. C. 
More Dev C. 
Table 4. Average household size, 1990, 2030 and 2100. 
North Africa 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Norlh Amcrica 
Central America 
South America 
West & Central Asia 
South Asia 
China & Hong Kong 
Southeast Asia 
Japan & Australia & New Zealand 
East Europe 
West Europe 
World 
More Developed Countries 
Less Developed Countries 
Central Scenario 
2030 2 100 
4.1 2.9 
4.2 2.0 
2.5 2.4 
3.3 2.6 
3.3 2.8 
3.8 2.8 
4.0 2.8 
3.1 2.8 
3.3 2.7 
2.9 3.0 
2.6 2.6 
2.5 2.5 
Low Sccnario 
2030 2 100 
3.7 2.5 
3.8 2.4 
2.3 2.2 
3.1 2.2 
3.0 2.5 
3.5 2.4 
3.7 2.5 
2.8 2.5 
3.1 2.4 
2.8 2.9 
2.4 2.3 
2.3 2.2 
High Scenario 
2030 2100 
4.5 3.3 
4.6 2.8 
Modified Ccntrnl Scenario 
1990 2030 2100 
5.7 3.6 2.6 
5.1 4.3 2.7 
2.6 2.7 2.7 
4.9 3.1 2.4 
4.4 3.0 2.6 
5.1 3.3 2.5 
5.7 3.3 2.4 
4.1 2.7 2.4 
4.8 3.0 2.5 
3.0 2.4 2.4 
2.9 2.5 2.6 
2.6 2.5 2.4 
Based on changes in the age structure alone, average household size in presently developed countries 
is likely to decline moderately. Only in the High Scenario, which combines high fertility (implying 
a high proportion of the population under 15) and hizh mortality (implying a small proportion of the 
population aged 60 and over), does it increase, and this only marginally, from its current 2.7 to 2.8. 
Average household size in presently developing countries, by contrast, is projected to decline 
significantly under all three scenarios. Thus, on the assumption that age-specific headship rates remain 
constant, the age-structure changes in the IIASA population projections imply that, by the end of the 
next century, average household size in developed and developing regions will converge -- to 2.5 and 
2.7, respectively, in the Central Scenario; 2.3 and 2.4 in the Low Scenario; and 2.8 and 3.0 in the High 
Scenario. This convergence will reflect essentially declines in average household size in developing 
regions, with average household size in developed regions remaining relatively constant. 
The effect of imposing average developed-region age-specific headship rates on developing regions is 
significant in the medium-term -- in 2030 the Modified Central Scenario envisions average household 
size of 3.3 in developing regions, as opposed to 3.7 in the Central Scenario -- but in the long term, the 
differences between the Central and Modified Central Scenarios are small; it is age structure which 
matters the most. 
Between 1950 and 1990, population in developing regions grew at an average rate of 2.2% and the 
number of households at 2.3%; in developed regions, the corresponding rates of growth were 0.9% and 
1.6% per year. Thus, whereas the "demographic growth gap" was 1.3% per year in terms of 
population, it was a much narrower 0.7% in terms of households. In the future, according to the 
projection results in Table 4, the gap will be broader, not narrower, for households than for population. 
In the Central Scenario, population in developed regions is projected to grow at an average rate of 
0.3% per year between 1990 and 2100, and households at a roughly equal rate of 0.4% per year. In 
developing regions, the corresponding growth rates are 0.9% per year and 1.4% per year, respectively. 
Thus the "demographic growth gap" of 0.6% per year in terms of population is projected to be a much 
wider 1.0% per year in terms of households. If age-specific headship rates decline in developing 
regions, as for example in the Modified Central Scenario, the differences will be even more dramatic. 
IPAT or IHAT? 
Despite the limitations indicated in the introduction, the IPAT identity has become the model of choice, 
or at least the model of first resort, in decomposing change in global environmental impacts into 
changes due to population growth and changes due to per person income growth.5 In this section, we 
illustrate differences which arise when the household, as opposed to the individual, is chosen as the 
demographic unit of account. 
Let 
P(t) = Population at time t 
y(t) = Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per person 
I(t) = Impact (resources utilized or pollution generated) 
a(t) = I(t)/Y(t), impact per unit GDP 
The large literature on the IPAT model is reviewed by MacKellar (1995), who concludes that the ceteris 
paribus assumptions which underlie the model are "simply massive." Harrison (1992) is a good example of the 
sort of decomposition presented below and Shaw (1993) of the sharp criticisms which have been levelled at such 
exercises. 
all at time t. Then 
The P A T  identity can be converted into an "IHAT" -- Impact-Households-Affluence-Technology -- 
identity simply by substituting households H(t) for population and measuring affluence in terms of 
income per household, which we will denote x(t): 
Each of the two alternative identities is no more valid than the assumption which underlies it: either 
impacts are considered as arising at the level of the household or at the level of the individual; there 
is no in-between assumption. The IPAT and IHAT models are entirely different; comparing them is 
like comparing apples and oranges! Or, to quote the immortal American expression, you pays your 
money and you takes your choice. 
We will take impact as one and the same thing as consumption C(t) of a natural resource, on the 
understanding that generalization to cover emission of a pollutant is straightforward. Using G to 
denote growth rates, in growth-rate form 
and the IHAT model is 
An Example: Growth in Energy Consumption. 1970-90 
Tables 5, 6 and 7 display population and household, GDP and energy consumption data which permit 
IPAT / IHAT decompositions of growth in world energy consumption in developed and developing 
countries over the period 1970-90; results are reported in Table 8. In the latter table, increase in 
energy demand accounted for by the rise in per person income and by the change in "technology" -- 
the ratio of energy to GDP -- are bracketed. This reflects the theme, developed by many researchers 
(Gilland 1986 for energy; MacKellar and Horlacher 1994a and 1994b for references from the energy 
literature; World Bank 1992a for references to concerning pollutants; Preston 1994 for pollutants; 
Cropper and Griffiths 1994 for deforestation) that environmental impact per unit of GDP varies 
predictably with per person (or per household) income. The assumption that change in technology is 
accounted for entirely by changes in the level of income is not strictly necessary to make the points 
which follow, but it does simplify matters by reducing the three-way P A T  decomposition to a two-way 
one. If the reader prefers to consider the bracketed term to be "economic growth plus unexplained 
shifts in technology," he or she will lose nothing. 
According to the P A T  identity (see Table 8), roughly half of growth in energy consumption in both 
developing and developed countries over this period was accounted for by demographic growth -- 
43.1% in the first case, 50.0% in the latter. Shifting to an IHAT framework does not drastically alter 
the decomposition for developing regions, but it completely changes the picture for developed 
countries. Now, the rate of growth of impacts is entirely accounted for; indeed, more than accounted 
for, by the rate of growth in the number of households. In Table 9, the same decomposition is done 
in terms of absolute annual change in energy consumption, which allows blame to be shared out among 
developed and developing regions without worrying about the level of disaggregation at which the 
decomposition is done (Lutz et al. 1993). The IPAT identity assigns 18.2% of the annual increase to 
developed-country demographic increase; the IHXT identic ass ins  11.59.  
Table 5. Population and households, 1970 and 1990. Source: Authors' estimates based on World 
Bank 1993 (population) and headship rate estimates discussed in text. Age-standardized rates 
calculated on basis of 1990 developed country population. 
Developing countries 
Persons (millions) 2,929 4,528 
Average annual % change 2.2 
Crude headship rate (per 1000) 196 208 
Age-standardized headship rate (per 1000) 329 
Households (millions) 574 943 
Average annual % change 2.5 
Persons per household 5.1 4.8 
Developed countries 
Persons (millions) 
Average annual % change 
Crude headship rate (per 1000) 
Age-standardized headship rate (per 1000) 
Households (millions) 
Average annual % change 
Persons per household 
Table 6. Gross national income, 1970 and 1990. Source: Authors' estimates based on World Bank 
1992b. 
Developing countries 
Total (millions 1987 US $) 
Average annual % change 
Per person (1987 US $) 
Average annual % change 
Per household (1987 US $) 
Average annual % change 
Developed countries 
Total (million 1987 US $) 
Average annual % change 
Per person (1987 US$) 
Average annual % change 
Per household (1987 US$) 
Average annual % change 
Table 7. Commercial energy consumption, 1970 and 1990. Source: Authors' estimates based on 
World Bank 1993. 
Developing countries 
Total (million kcal oil equivalent) 
Average annual % change 
Per person (kcal oil equivalent) 
Average annual % change 
Per household (kcal oil equivalent) 
Average annual % change 
Per unit GDP 
Developed countries 
Total (million kcal oil equivalent) 
Average annual % change 
Per person (kcal oil equivalent) 
Average annual % change 
Per household (kcal oil equivalent) 
Average annual O/c change 
Per unit GDP 
Table 8. Sources of growth in energy consumption, 1970-1990: IPAT versus IHAT Model, growth 
rate form. 
IPAT Model 
Growth rate of Due to growth Due to growth Due to change 
energy consumption of population of income per in technology 
(% per year) person 
Developing 5.1 2.2 
(43.1 %) 
u
(56.9%) 
Developed 
IHAT Model 
Growth rate of Due to growth Due to growth Due to change 
energy consumption of number of in income per in technology 
(% per year) households household 
Developing 5.1 2.5 1.9 0.7, 
?- 
Developed 
Table 9. Average annual change in energy consumption, 1970-1990 (million kcal oil equivalent). 
Developing countries 
Developed countries 
Total 
P A T  Model 
Due to growth in Other 
population 
38,756 5 1,087 
(27.5%) (36.2%) 
25,599 25,599 
(18.2%) (18.2%) 
IHAT Model 
Due to growth in Other 
number of households 
Developing countries 46,143 43,700 
(32.7%) (3 1 .O%) 
Developed countries 58,5 11 -7,3 15 
(4 1.5%) (-5.2%) 
Total 
Total 
Total 
Table 10. The IHAT Model again: Population growth, changing age structure, and changing age- 
specific headship rates. 
IHAT Model 
Growth rate Due to Due to Due to change Other 
of energy growth of change in age in age-specific 
consumption population structure headship rates 
(% per year) 
Developing 5.1 2.2 0.4 -0.1 2.6 
(43.1%) (7.8%) (-2.0%) (5 1 .O%) 
Developed 1.4 0.7 0.7 0.2 -0.2 
(50.0%) (50.0%) (14.3%) (-14.3%) 
Based on such estimates, an argument could be constructed that Western behavioral patterns, in the 
form of a tendency towards increasingly atomized living arrangements, bear a heavy burden of blame 
for rising energy consumption. This would be premature, however, as the story is not over. Recall 
from the discussion above the impact of shifts in population age structure. In Table 10, we expand 
the IHAT decomposition to show the growth in the number of households which would have occurred 
holding age-structure constant (that portion which reflects behavioral change) and the growth which 
resulted from shifts in age-structure (holding age-specific headship rates constant). In the case of 
developed countries, half the contribution of demographic effects arose from the rate of population 
growth and half from changes in age distribution. A striking fact which emerges in the IHAT 
framework is that the fertility decline which brings about deceleration in the rate of overall population 
growth, presumably relieving pressure on the environment, contributes to population ageing and the 
consequent rise in the proportion of the population in age groups characterized by high age-specific 
headship rates. Fertility decline will, of course, reduce the number of households twenty or thirty years 
hence, but in the longer run, its impact on the number of households is limited by the age-structure 
change. In short, when environmental impact is considered to be at least in part related to the number 
of households as opposed to the number of individuals, and when account is taken of how changing 
age structure affects the number of households, the relationship between fertility decline and future 
environmental impacts is less straightfonvard than might be imagined. 
Another Example: Projected Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 1990-2100 
Like the historical decomposition exercise presented above, projections of future trends are also 
dependent on which model is chosen. Table 11 presents the results of the following exercise. Four 
alternative assumptions were made regarding C 0 2  emissions. The first is that these remain constant 
in per person terms and the second is that these remain constant in per household terms. The third is 
that per person emissions grow 1 .O% per year in developing countries and 0.4% per year in developed 
countries; this is the central scenario elaborated by the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change 
(Houghton et al. 1992). The fourth is that per household emissions grow 1 .O% per year in developing 
countries and 0.4% in developed countries. These four assumed emissions paths were then combined 
with the IIASA population projection and the Central household projection presented in Table 4 to 
calculate total global C 0 2  emissions. As shown in Table 11, projections vary widely depending on 
which model is chosen. If the IPAT model is selected and emissions are assumed to remain constant 
in per person terms, an increase of 88% is projected between 1990 and 2100. If, by contrast, the IHAT 
model is selected and emissions are assumed to remain constant in per household terms, the projected 
increase is 167%, almost exactly double. If the IPAT model is selected and emissions are assumed 
to grow in per person terms, a quadrupling of emissions is projected; if the IHAT model is selected 
and emissions are assumed to grow at the same rate, but in per household terms, an increase of over 
six-fold is projected. 
Table 11. Projected growth in total C 0 2  emissions, 1990-2100. 
Average annual % change, Total emissions, 2100 
by region, 1990-2 100 (1990 : 100) 
LDC MDC 
IPAT Model 
Constant per person emissions 0.9 0.4 188 
Growing per person emissions 1.9 0.7 399 
IHAT Model 
Constant per household emissions 1.4 0.4 
Growing per household emissions 2.4 0.7 
The IPAT and IHAT models represent extreme positions, the first assuming no household-level 
economies of scale whatsoever in the activities which generate C02, and the second assuming perfect 
economies of scale. Presumably, the truth lies somewhere in between, meaning that, under the constant 
emissions assumption, an increase in total emissions of somewhere between 88% and 167% would be 
expected and, under the growing emissions assumption, an increase between four- and six-fold would 
be expected. These substantial ranges of variation can be narrowed down only by research into the 
importance of household-level economies of scale in the activities which emit C02. 
CONCLUSION 
In both presently industrialized and developing countries,' the proportion of the population aged under 
15 is expected to decline and the proportion of the population aged 60 and over is expected to rise. 
Even bamng further increases in age-specific headship rates in developed countries, and even without 
taking into account weakening of the extended traditional family in the face of "modernization" in the 
developing countries, the number of households will grow more rapidly than the number of people. 
Decomposition exercises which seek to assign blame for environmental impacts, as well as forecasts 
of impacts such as C 0 2  emissions, are sensitive to the demographic unit of account employed. Should 
this be the individual, the household, the community, or what? Until more is known about the nature 
of the activities which give rise to environmental impacts, the answer will not be clear. In the future, 
it might be possible to employ a model such as I = C + aPAT + bHAT, where C is a constant 
covering impacts that are not proportional to either demographic units or income (waste from military 
sources, for example) and a and b are the weights to impacts which are specific to individuals and 
households. The kind of model chosen should depend entirely on the nature of the specific 
environmental impact studied and the best information we have about its sources and the kinds of 
agents that produce it. 
Meanwhile, it would be very unwise to draw far-reaching conclusions about the impact of demographic 
variables on the environment from one specific choice of model without a substantive justification of 
that choice. 
STATISTICAL NOTE 
Average household size for each of the twelve regions in each of the years 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980 
and 1990 was approximated on the basis of incomplete country-specific household size estimates taken 
from the UN Demographic Yearbook for 1991. For space reasons, the country-level data used to infer 
regional trends are not presented here, but are available from the authors. In some regions, data for 
major countries are unavailable; therefore, the size of the error in regional estimates will vary from year 
to year and from region to region. The data appear sufficient, however, to estimate overall trends fairly 
accurately. 
Age-specific headship rates for each of the twelve regions for around 1985 were also estimated on the 
basis of country-specific age-specific headship rates. In this case, the data were taken from the 1987 
Demographic Yearbook. Again, available data are incomplete. Since Table 3 reveals only slight 
differences between regions, however, the regional estimates are likely to be fairly accurate. 
Disaggregation of household-size changes between 1950 and 1990 was done the following way: in a 
first step, age- and region-specific headship rates in around 1985 (estimated as described above) were 
assumed to remain constant over time throughout the period 1950-1990. Household-size estimates for 
1950, 1970 and 1980 were calculated by applying the constant rates to changing age distributions. 
Changes over time in these estimates, then, can be assumed to be the result purely of changes in the 
age structure of the population. Effects of changes in age-specific headship rates are calculated as a 
residual; they are just the difference between the household size estimates assuming constant headship 
rates and the average household size estimated on the basis of data in the 1991 Demographic Yearbook. 
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